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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a denial of appellant's petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Ut;ah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant's writ of habeas corpus was denied by the
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, without an evidentiary hearing.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lower court's
denial of the appellant's writ of habeas corpus.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees generally with the facts as expressed by petitioner in his brief with the following additions and clarifications.
Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment in the Utah
State Prison pursuant to a plea of guilty entered at a
hearing before the Honorable Charles G. Cowley, Second
District Court, Ogden, Utah, on March 16, 1964. At that
hearing the appellant was represented by a court-appointed attorney, Robert E. Froerer. A plea of guilty was
entered by the appellant to the charge of second degree
burglary (Case No. 7497). The appellant was placed on
probation but because of a subsequent arrest and conviction for third degree burglary, the probation was revoked
and the appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison
for a term of not less than one month nor more than
twenty years, based upon his earlier guilty plea.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE PETITIONER WAS NOT DE N IE D
C 0 UN SE L D UR I NG THE CRITICAL
STAGES OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.
In the memorandum decision of Judge Bryant H.
C;_·oft dismissing the petitioner's previous writ of habeas
corpus (No. 194454), the Findings of Fact (Nos. 2 and

indicate that although the petitioner waived his right
to counsel at the preliminary hearing, the Court appointed
Robert E. Froerer to represent the petitioner before any
plea was taken (No. 5). At the time the petitioner entsred his guilty plea, he had been fully and completely
advised by counsel, and intelligently entered his plea.
The EJL:i.g2s of the proceeding prior to the time that
a plea is entered are not considered critical in Utah. In
Ash v. Turner, No. 692-69 (10th Cir. Apr. 6, 1970), the
Tenth Circu'.t Court of Appeals outlined the elements of
a C"itical stage, explaining:

"An important criterion in determining
whether the proceeding is 'critical' is whether it
is one in which pleas to the charge could be made
. . . A critical stage has also been said to be one
in which certain rights may be sacrificed or lost."
In Utah, no plea is made at the time of charging and pre-

liminary examination, and as a result, the Utah Supreme
Court in Crouch v. State of Utah, 24 Utah 2d 126, 467
P. 2d 43 (1970), stated:
"In Utah a preliminary hearing is not a critical stage in a criminal proceeding. No plea can
be given, and the only purpose of having a preliminary hearing is for the committing magistrate
to ascertain if there is evidence to warrant holding
the defendant to answer a charge in the district
court . . . A preliminary hearing serves the same
purpose as a grand jury investigation." Id. at 44.
The petitioner cites Moore v. Michigan, 355 U. S. 155
(1957), for the proposition that due process is violated
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where an accused of limited education and mental capacity expressly waives the right to counsel. The facts of
that case, however, are distinguishable from the case at
bar.
In Moore, the defendant was a seventeen year old
negro with a seventh grade education, who was allowed to
waive his right to counsel throughout the entire proceeding. Unlike the case at bar, Moore waived counsel,
pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to the maximum punishment for his crime. Given the facts of Moore, a denial
of due process was evident since the defendant was not
represented by counsel when the plea was taken and the
sentence imposed. The instant case may be distinguished
from Moore because the appellant was adequately repre·
sented by counsel throughout all critical stages of the
proceedings.
Even if the petitioner could not have intelligently
waived counsel because of a mental deficiency, the pre·
liminary examination is not considered critical in Utah
and the subsequent appointment of counsel for the plea
and sentencing was all that was necessary to satisfy the
requirements of due process.
POINT II.
THE PETITIONER DID NOT REQUEST
THAT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING BE
HELD AFTER OBTAINING COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL AND THEREFORE
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CANNOT NOW COMPLAIN OF HIS
WAIVER.
Generally, when an accused waives the preliminary
hearing, and later obtains counsel and wishes to challenge
the waiver, the court will readily remand the case for
such a hearing. In Seibold v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 165,
435 P. 2d 289 (1967), the Court explained:
"When a defendant without counsel waives
the hearing and a lawyer thereafter appears or is
appointed for him at arraignment, it is usual to
have the district attorney tell the lawyer what the
evidence will be; and if the lawyer is not satisfied,
he asks the court to remand the case for preliminary hearing, and under our practice the preliminary hearing is granted as a matter of course. In
fact, the county attorney testified at the habeas
corpus proceeding that he had never known a time
when the district court did not refer a matter
back for preliminary hearing when requested to
do so." Id. at 290.
Therefore, if the petitioner had actually been denied
due process of law when the court allowed him to proceed
without counsel, the petitioner with his subsequently appointed counsel could have asked the court to remand the
case for a preliminary hearing. Having failed to do so,
the petitioner cannot now complain of his waiver.

POINT III.
THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY AFFORDED A FULL EVIDENTIARY
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HEARING ON THESE SAME ISSUES AND
IS NOW BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.

By comparing the appellant's previous petition for a
wdt of habeas corpus (Case No. 194454) with the petition
in the instant case, the justification for Judge Baldwin's
summary denial (R. 13) is evident. In paragraph No. 5
of the petition dated July 13, 1970, the appellant alleges
the same deprivations and raises the identical issues that
are found in the instant petition (R. 4). Both petitions
allege a denial of the constitutional right to counsel because the appellant's illiteracy and mental state did not
allow him to intelligently waive counsel. This issue was
raised and adjudicated before Judge Croft, and that prior
determination bars this petition.
The problem of repititious writs of habeas corpus has
already been recognized by the Utah Supreme Court. The
general doctrine that res judicata is to be applied to
habeas corpus proceedings was thoroughly explained in
Burleigh v. Turner, 15 Utah 2d 118, 388 P. 2d 412 (1964).
In that case, a petition was denied by the Third District
Court for Salt Lake County. The petitioner subsequently
filed the same petition with the Utah Supreme Court
which referred it to the Fourth District Court. The Fourth
District Court denied the writ and on appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the judgment denying the writ
in the Third District Court was res judicata in the latter
proceeding wherein the writ of habeas corpus was sought
on the same grounds. The court explained:
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"That the doctrine of res judicata is applicable
to habeas corpus proceedings is supported by Rule
65B (f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
wherein a petitioner must allege, among other
things, that the legality of the imprisonment has
not been adjudged in a prior proceeding and also
whether another petition for the same relief has
been denied by another court. The obvious purpose of this rule is to discourage successive applications based upon the same grounds and the
courts need not entertain them." Id. at 414.
Therefore, the Court's holding establishes the basic
premise that res judicata is to be applied to habeas corpus
proceedings in Utah, and therefore bars this petition.
CONCLUSION
The court below committed no error and the denial
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney General
DAVID R. IRVINE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

